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This paper establishes that credit ratings affect the choice of payment method in mergers and 
acquisitions. We find that bidders holding a high rating level are more likely to use cash 
financing in a takeover. We attribute this finding to lower financial constraints and enhanced 
capability of highly rated firms to access public debt markets as implied by their higher credit 
quality. Our results are economically significant and robust to several firm- and deal-specific 
characteristics and are not sensitive to the method used to measure the likelihood of the 
payment choice or after controlling for potential endogeneity bias.  
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Credit Rating Agencies (CRAs) play an important role in the finance world by 
assessing the creditworthiness of a particular firm, security or obligation (Securities and 
Exchange Commision (2003)) and assigning a rating. CRAs disclose and disseminate this 
information to the market (Healy and Palepu (2001)), alleviating information asymmetry and, 
consequently, lowering the firm’s cost of capital. Additionally, prior studies provide evidence 
on how a firm’s capability to access public debt markets, implied either by the existence of 
firm credit rating
1
 or rating level,
2
 can influence capital structure or investment decisions. In 
this respect, Koziol and Lawrenz (2010) argue that, due to the existence of rating-triggered 
events, like step-up bonds, loss of access to the commercial paper market and strategic 
advantages in bidding for contracts, credit ratings exert influence on firm capital structure 
decisions.  
In turn, the capital structure decision has been proven to be of great importance in the  
corporate financing decision of merger and acquisition (M&As) investments. Bidding firms 
conduct M&As by using either cash or stock as the sole consideration in the transaction, 
while some transactions employ a mixture of cash and stock means of payment.
3
 A growing 
body of prior M&A studies has provided evidence that cash-financed acquisitions are to a 
great extent funded by debt.
4
 Moreover, in the literature which relates investment decisions 
with financial constraints, Fazzari, Hubbard, Petersen, Blinder and Poterba (1988) argue that 
information asymmetry influences firm investment decisions because it creates financial 
constraints in the credit markets. Along these lines, Whited (1992), Gilchrist and Himmelberg 
                                                             
1
 See Cantillo and Wright (2000), Faulkender and Petersen (2006), Lemmon and Zender (2010), Mittoo and 
Zhang (2008) and Harford and Uysal (2013)).  
2
 See Diamond (1991), Bolton and Freixas (2000), Denis and Mihov (2003), Rauh and Sufi (2010) and Gopalan, 
Song and Yerramilli (2014)).  
3
 The use of cash as a method of payment in corporate takeovers was prevalent during the 1980’s, followed by a 
decline during the 1990’s, and it became popular again over the first decade of the new century (see Andrade, 
Mitchell and Stafford (2001) and  Martynova and Renneboog (2008)).  
4
 For instance, Bharadwaj and Shivdasani (2003), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Harford, Klasa and Walcott 
(2009), Uysal (2011) and Elsas, Flannery and Garfinkel (2013)).  
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(1995), Almeida, Campello and Weisbach (2004) and Campello and Chen (2010) use credit 
ratings as a measure of firm financial constraints in the credit markets and suggest that the 
existence of credit ratings reduces information asymmetry about firm value, thus lowering 
financial constraints. This allows firms with rated public debt to issue funds in a short notice 
according to their investment needs.  
However, one could argue that the mere existence of a credit rating does not prove ex-
ante that a rated firm exhibits a higher capability to borrow funds. To illustrate this, assume 
we have two firms A and B. Firm A has high growth opportunities and a robust financial 
structure, but it lacks public debt and credit rating. On the other hand, firm B has lower 
growth opportunities and a very low credit rating, as it faces a high debt burden and large 
bankruptcy costs. Obviously, in this case the unrated firm A has a higher debt capacity than 
firm B, despite the fact that it does not hold a credit rating. The above discussion raises two 
interesting questions with regards to the relationship between bidders’ credit ratings, as 
implied by their capability to access public debt markets, and the choice of method of 
payment. Does the sole existence of the bidding firms’ credit ratings - irrespective of the level 
- affect the financing decision in M&As? What is the effect of a rating level on the choice of 
the acquisitions’ means of exchange? 
Motivated by the low financial constraints of (highly) rated firms due to their relatively 
higher debt capacity and credit quality, we address these questions and examine the role of 
credit ratings in the choice of payment method in mergers and acquisitions. Pertaining to debt 
capacity, numerous prior studies use credit rating existence as a measure of debt capacity.
5
 
Accordingly, Billett, Hribar and Liu (2011) argue that firms with higher credit ratings face 
lower cost of debt, which, ceteris paribus, leads to increased debt capacity.  
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With respect to credit quality, Liu and Malatesta (2005) and Frank and Goyal (2009) 
posit that the higher the level of credit ratings, the lower the information asymmetry and the 
adverse selection problem faced by firms. Additionally, Rauh and Sufi (2010) demonstrate 
that low credit quality firms appear to rely more frequently on costly forms of debt financing 
that include secured bank-debt with tight covenants for liquidity and subordinated public-debt 
relative to high credit quality firms. Moreover, evidence from studies that examine 
specifically the effect of credit rating levels on bond yield spreads and exposure to rollover-
risk demonstrate a strong negative relationship.
6
 Finally, several regulations of financial 
institutions and other intermediaries are directly tied to credit ratings issued by “Nationally 
Recognized Statistical Rating Organizations” (NRSROs) (see Kisgen (2007)). In particular, a 
large number of institutional investors are barred from investing in low credit rating firms or 
below a certain threshold (investment grade) due to concerns related with investors’ wealth 
protection. Thus, firms with high levels of credit ratings overcome these regulatory 
constraints and face a wider “investor base” when seeking to borrow funds in order to finance 
specific investment projects.  
In this study, we use a sample of US acquisitions of publicly traded bidders over the 
period 1998-2009 in order to explore our main hypotheses which are summarized as follows: 
1) bidders holding a credit rating should have better access to public debt markets. Therefore, 
this lack of financial constraints makes them less reluctant to spend their cash today as it will 
be relatively easier for them to borrow “fresh cash” in the future whenever needed.
7
 
However, this hypothesis does not take into account the full dimensions of a firm’s debt 
capacity condition as analyzed above. In fact, the mere existence of bidding firms’ credit 
                                                             
6
 See West (1973), Liu and Thakor (1984), Ederington, Yawitz and Roberts (1987), Ziebart and Reiter (1992), 
Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) and Gopalan, Song and Yerramilli (2014)).  
7
 Note that cash used in M&A transactions may be sourced either from past operations or from additional debt; 
the source of accumulated cash is beyond the scope of this paper. The point we wish to make here is that, 
irrespective of the source of cash, rated bidders might be more inclined to make use of it due to their ease of 
access to the credit markets in the future. 
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rating does not necessarily mean higher debt capacity than unrated firms and therefore  does 
not imply ceteris paribus a positive relation with the use of cash financing in M&As. Hence, 
the sign and magnitude of the association between rating existence and cash means of 
exchange are matters of empirical investigation; 2) bidders with a higher credit rating level 
(i.e., better credit quality) face relatively better opportunities to borrow due to lower cost and 
higher demand for their debt securities. Therefore, we expect a positive relationship between 
rating level and cash method of payment in M&As. 
We use different econometric methodologies to measure the probability of the choice of 
payment method and we find that: i) The likelihood of a cash offer or fraction of cash used as 
payment method in the takeover bid are not significantly associated with bidder credit rating 
existence; ii) The likelihood of a cash offer or fraction of cash used in the acquisition bid 
have a strong positive relationship with bidding firm credit rating level. In economic terms, 
after transforming the coefficients of our regressions into average marginal effects, one point 
rise in bidder rating level increases the likelihood of cash means of financing used in an 
M&A transaction by 7.04% over the sample average; iii) Unused debt capacity, measured 
with the relative credit rating level of bidder to target, also appears to be a determinant of 
cash financing in M&As corroborating the view that credit ratings are related with the choice 
of payment method in acquisitions; iv) Our main results continue to hold even after 
controlling for the possible endogenous nature of the main variables of interest, credit rating 
existence and credit rating level.   
This study has several contributions in the M&As, capital structure and credit ratings 
literature. First, it adds to the existing literature on the determinants of method of payment, 
and particularly the association between a firm’s credit rating and the use of cash or stock 
financing in acquisitions. Second, it examines both credit rating existence and credit rating 
level as measures of a firm’s capability to access public debt markets. Third, it provides 
5 
 
further evidence regarding the relation between credit ratings and a firm’s capital structure 
decisions; in particular, the financing decision in takeover bids. In general, our results imply 
that credit ratings mitigate information asymmetry and, consequently, reduce bidding firms’  
cost of capital; firms holding a high rating face lower financial constraints and can issue 
public debt for investment reasons with relatively less frictions. Our findings also provide 
further direct implications for academics and practitioners. In particular, bidding  firms with 
high credit quality and access to public debt markets are able to make cash acquisitions and, 
therefore, rip the benefits related to that form of payment. More specifically, prior literature 
shows that bidders using cash currency enjoy non-negative abnormal returns in acquisitions 
of both public
8
 and private targets.
9
 Moreover, there is empirical evidence that the use of cash 




This study is related to a number of previous works, for instance, those that examine the 
determinants of the method of payment choice.
11
 In particular, Faccio and Masulis (2005), 
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) and Uysal (2011), who investigate the impact of a firm’s 
debt capacity on the cash-stock choice of payment are more directly related to our work. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) use bidder’s leverage, collateral and interlocking directorships, 
whereas Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) and Uysal (2011) use the deviation from bidder’s 
target debt ratios as a measure of debt capacity. We, instead, use credit ratings as measures of 
debt capacity and credit quality. Sufi (2009) examines the effect of the introduction of 
syndicated bank loan ratings on various firm financing and investment decisions, including 
                                                             
8
 See Travlos (1987), Brown and Ryngaert (1991), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Schlingemann 
(2004)).  
9
 See Chang (1998), Moeller, Schlingemann and Stulz (2004) and Officer, Poulsen and Stegemoller (2009)).  
10
 See Fishman (1989), Jennings and Mazzeo (1993), Betton, Eckbo and Thorburn (2009), and Chemmanur, 
Paeglis and Simonyan (2009)).  
11
 See Jensen (1986), Hansen (1987), Fishman (1989), Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), Berkovitch and 
Narayanan (1990), Eckbo, Giammarino and Heinkel (1990), Martin (1996), Shleifer and Vishny (2003), 
Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004), Faccio and Masulis (2005), Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009), 
Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) and Uysal (2011).  
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the decision to pay with cash for the consummation of an acquisition. In our paper, we focus 
on the relationship between long term bond ratings and method of payment in corporate 
acquisitions. More recently, Alshwer, Sibilkov and Zaiats (2011) study the relationship 
between financial constraints and the choice of payment method in M&As. Our study focuses 
particularly on the direct effects of credit ratings in the M&A financing method using several 
credit rating variables in the empirical analysis. Furthermore, Harford and Uysal (2014) 
investigate the impact of bidding firm access to bond markets, as implied by the existence of 
credit ratings, on the decision to initiate a takeover and shareholders’ value creation. In our 
study, we are interested in the influence of both credit rating existence and credit rating level 
in a different acquisition decision; that is, the choice of payment method. Faulkender and 
Petersen (2006), Kisgen (2006, 2009) and Lemmon and Zender (2010)  examine the effect of 
credit ratings on firms’ capital structure. In this work, we study the impact of credit ratings on 
firms’ financing decision – that is, in turn, related with their capital structure – in the context 
of M&As. 
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the determinants 
of the choice of method of payment in M&As documented in prior literature providing also 
the variables definitions used in the empirical analysis. Section 3 describes our sample. 
Section 4 analyzes the methodology and findings of our empirical tests. We present further 
robustness checks of our results in Section 5. Finally, Section 6 concludes the paper. 
 
2. Determinants of the Method of Payment Choice and Variables Definitions 
 
2.1 Debt Capacity, Financial Condition, Market Credit Risk and Method of Payment 
Prior literature has shown that there are several factors that capture debt capacity. 
Faccio and Masulis (2005) use the collateral variable, which is the ratio of property, plant 
7 
 
and equipment (PPE) to book value of total assets at the year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement to proxy for debt capacity. Hovakimian, Opler and Titman (2001) report a 
strong positive effect of tangible assets to the firm’s level of debt. The bidder’s size is another 
variable of relevance, as larger firms are more diversified and, hence, have a lower 
probability of default, enabling them to issue more debt. To account for this effect, the 
variable size is used, which is the natural logarithm of the market value of equity 4 weeks 
prior to the acquisition announcement. Furthermore, financial leverage controls for bidder’s 
financial condition. The variable leverage is measured by the ratio of a firm’s total financial 
debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) to the book value of total assets in the 
fiscal year prior to the acquisition announcement. The predicted sign of this variable is 
ambiguous as Faccio and Masulis (2005) find a negative association between leverage and 
the likelihood of cash, while Harford, Klasa and Walcott (2009) report a positive relation. 
Finally, in order to capture the effect of market credit conditions, Harford (2005) uses the 
variable interest rate spread, which is the spread between the average rate on commercial and 
industrial loans and the Federal Funds rate. This variable is provided by the Federal Reserve 
Senior Loan Officer’s (SLO) survey and proxies for the ease of financing or credit constraints 
in the economy.
12
 When the spread is low, and therefore firms face relatively lower cost of 
debt capital, the likelihood of cash acquisition should be higher. Therefore, a negative 
relationship between the interest rate spread and the likelihood of cash deals is predicted. 
 
2.2 Growth Opportunities, Market Timing and Method of Payment 
The investment opportunities theory posits that a relation between acquirer valuation 
and mode of acquisition exists, as long as the firms with more growth opportunities avoid 
                                                             
12
 We also use in our empirical analysis additional proxies of market credit conditions; these are the yield spread 
between BBB-AAA bonds (see Longstaff (2004)) and the corporate yield spread (see Duffee (1998)). The bond 
data for the construction of the latter (i.e., corporate yield spread) were collected from TRACE database, and 
start from 2002. Our general results are qualitatively similar. 
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underinvestment problems caused by high levels of debt finance; in response to that, they 
prefer to use stock (see Martin (1996) and Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996)). To proxy for growth 
opportunities, the bidder’s book to market ratio is used and a positive relationship with the 
likelihood of a cash consideration is expected. The variable  book-to-market is defined as the 
book value of equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition announcement divided by 
the market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement.  
Moreover, according to the market overvaluation theory (see Shleifer and Vishny 
(2003) and Rhodes-Kropf and Viswanathan (2004)), acquirers favor stock acquisitions when 
their equity is relatively overvalued to target firms’ equity in order to decrease acquisition 
costs. Faccio and Masulis (2005) use run-up to measure bidder overvaluation. Run-up is the 
bidder market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns over the period (-205, -6) days prior to the 
acquisition announcement.  
 
2.3 Asymmetric Information, Target Status and Method of Payment 
Hansen (1987) and Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009) suggest that bidder 
information asymmetry plays a significant role in the choice of payment method in M&As. 
Particularly, in cases where bidders possess proprietary information about their own value, 
they are more likely to use stock when their firm stock is considered relatively “overvalued” 
and cash when their firms’ stock is considered relatively “undervalued”. Accordingly, the  
higher the degree of information asymmetry faced by target firms when evaluating bidders’ 
offer, the higher the likelihood of accepting a cash offer as the acceptance of bidder’s equity 
might turn out to be a costly option if the bidder is overvalued. To control for information 
asymmetry, we employ the variable number of analysts, which is the number of analysts 
following the firm as reported by IBES for the last month of the fiscal year preceding the 
acquisition announcement. For firms that are not covered by the IBES database, we assume 
9 
 
that the number of analysts is zero and assign this number in our estimations.
13
 Chemmanur, 
Paeglis and Simonyan (2009) argue that the greater the number of analysts the lower the 
information asymmetry about firm value. 
Additionally, Faccio and Masulis (2005) take into account the effect of target status on 
the choice of payment method. This is justified on the grounds that in deals where an unlisted 
target is involved, the seller’s consumption/liquidity needs have to be considered. These 
sellers are likely to prefer cash due to the illiquid and concentrated nature of their portfolio 
holdings in a timely attempt to cash out their wealth opportunities. To capture target status, 
the private variable is used, which is an indicator variable taking the value of 1 for an unlisted 
target and 0 otherwise.  
 
2.4 Firm Control, Monitoring and Method of Payment 
In the spirit of Stulz (1988) and Jung, Kim and Stulz (1996) the likelihood of losing 
control in their firm leads managers to prefer debt or internal resources relative to equity 
when deciding to finance an acquisition; this is due to the fact that issuance of new stock is 
likely to dilute their stake in the bidding firm leading to a loss of control and outside 
intervention. Thus, managers with higher ownership stakes in the bidding firm are more 
likely to use cash as a payment form in takeover bids (see Amihud, Lev and Travlos (1990), 
Martin (1996), Ghosh and Ruland (1998) and Faccio and Masulis (2005)).   
Furthermore, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Burkart, Gromb and Panunzi (1997)  
argue that blockholders can monitor the action of corporate managers which helps align the 
interests of managers and shareholders and leads to better corporate performance. Among 
others, one of the major actions that large investors can take to improve corporate 
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 Following Krishnaswami and Subramaniam (1999), we also use other measures of information asymmetry 
such as the analysts forecasts’ error and the standard deviation of analysts’ forecasts with data retrieved from 




performance is to advise and put pressure on bidder’s managers to proceed to a potential bid 
or abandon it. These actions include judgments about the terms of the acquisition bid such as 
the choice of the payment method. To capture these effects, the variable blockholder 
ownership is employed, which is a measure of the aggregate holdings of blockholders who 
own at least 5% of the firm’s stock. We anticipate that the likelihood of pure stock takeover 
deals should be lower when blockholdings are higher. 
 
2.5 Pecking Order, Free Cash Flow and Method of Payment 
Myers (1984) argues, in his pecking order theory, that managers follow a financing 
hierarchy; that is, they use firstly internal finance, then debt, and finally external equity 
financing. Moreover, Jensen (1986) states that firms with large amounts of free cash flow are 
likely to conduct value destroying acquisitions with cash. In particular, firms with large 
amounts of cash, cash flow or sufficient amount of debt capacity are more likely to use cash 
to finance their various investment projects. To control for this effect, cash flows to assets 
variable is used, which represents the income before extraordinary items plus depreciation 
minus dividends on common and preferred stock divided by firm’s book value of total assets 
at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement. We expect a 
positive association between this variable and the likelihood of a cash acquisition.    
 
2.6 Hostility, Competition, Mode of Acquisition, Relative Size, Intra-Industry Deals 
and Method of Payment 
In addition, the characteristics of a takeover deal might have an influence on the 
payment method. In hostile acquisitions or in cases where more than one bidders compete for 
a particular target, the bidder might want to consummate the deal relatively quickly and deter 
competition (see Fishman (1989) and Berkovitch and Narayanan (1990)) thus choosing cash 
11 
 
as medium of exchange. Therefore, hostile deals variable is used, which is an indicator 
variable taking the value of 1 for hostile acquisitions and 0 otherwise. The variable 
competition proxies for the degree of competition the bidder faces during a takeover; this is 
an indicator variable taking the value of 1 when more than one bidders enter the bidding 
contest and 0 otherwise.   
Furthermore, cash is also preferred in tender offers when the bidder incumbent 
management desires to close the deal earlier. That is because tender offers with stock must be 
made in accordance with the Securities Act of 1933, which entails a substantial delay, mainly 
because the registration statement must be reviewed by the SEC (see Martin (1996)). Tender 
offers is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for acquisitions labeled as tender offers in 
Thomson Financial SDC and 0 otherwise.  
Moreover, the likelihood of using cash is likely to decrease by the size of the target 
relative to the bidder, because it is more difficult to raise large amounts of cash as the size of 
the deal increases to very high levels. To control for this effect, Harford, Klasa and Walcott 
(2009) employ the variable relative size. Relative size is defined as the value of the 
transaction divided by bidder market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition 
announcement.  
Finally, the industry diversification effect is another important determinant of the 
choice of the payment method. Faccio and Masulis (2005) argue that in unrelated industries 
in which sellers are not well acquainted with the industry risks and prospects of the bidder’s 
business sector, they should be relatively more reluctant to accept stock as a method of 
payment, primarily because of bidder’s overvaluation risk. In this case, sellers are likely to 
prefer cash in order to mitigate the overvaluation problem. To capture this effect, the 
diversifying deals variable is used, which is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 for inter-
12 
 
industry transactions, and 0 for intra-industry transactions. Industries are defined at the 2-
digit SIC level from the Thomson Financial SDC.  
 
3. Sample and Data 
3.1 Sample Selection Criteria 
We download a sample of US domestic acquisitions announced over the period January 
1, 1998 and December 31, 2009 from the Thomson Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions 
Database. The start date of the sample was driven by the availability of data for all variables 
used in the empirical analysis.
14
 The sample consists of both successful and unsuccessful 
deals. We require deals to have non-missing transaction value and payment method 
information. Bidders are listed firms and targets are either listed or private firms. The original 
sample includes 13,048 deals. We remove from the sample all deals classified as repurchases, 
liquidations, restructurings, divestitures, leveraged buyouts, reverse takeovers, privatizations, 
bankruptcy acquisitions and going private transactions. This reduces the sample to 10,828 
observations. Furthermore, to include in the sample deals that represent a transfer of control, 
we require that the bidder owns less than 10% of target shares before the announcement and 
seeks to acquire more than 50% after the acquisition. There are 10,166 transactions that meet 
these criteria. Furthermore, we drop deals worth less than US$ 1 million and less than 1% of 
a bidder market value to avoid noise in the analysis. Eventually, there are 6,819 deals that 
satisfy the above requirements.  
Credit rating information for the bidder is collected from COMPUSTAT. Credit ratings 
represent the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit ratings. In our 
sample, the highest level of bidder one month prior to the acquisition announcement is AAA 
                                                             
14 Specifically, this is due to availability of blockholder ownership data from the Thomson ONE ownership 
database. This database provides ownership data starting from 31
st
 March 1997 and therefore we prefer to start 
our sample from 1
st
 January 1998 in order to have a more coherent collection of years. In fact, our main results 
are similar when we include the remaining observations of the year 1997.  
13 
 
and the lowest is CCC. Out of the 6,819 transactions, 1,747 transactions involve bidders with 
a credit rating and 5,072 transactions with unrated firms. The main variables of interest are i) 
the rating existence, which is an indicator taking the value of 1 if a bidding firm has a credit 
rating one month prior to the acquisition announcement, and 0 otherwise; and ii) the rating 
level, which is an ordinal variable ranging from 1 to 22.
15,16 
 
3.2 Sample Statistics   
Table 1 presents descriptive statistics for the overall sample and by payment method 
(i.e., more than 50% cash and less than 50% cash). For the entire sample of 6,819 
acquisitions, 3,156 targets are acquired with more than 50% cash and 3,583 acquisitions 
comprise less than 50% cash means of transaction. There are also 80 acquisitions that are 
financed exactly with 50% cash and 50% stock. Panel A demonstrates bidder specific 
characteristics, which appear to differ between the two payment types. The proportion of 
bidders holding a credit rating (rating existence) is higher in cash-dominated financed deals 
(27.79%) than bidders in acquisitions with less than 50% cash (24.11%). The mean difference 
is statistically significant at the 1% level. Mean bidder size for cash-dominated deals is US$ 
3,672.396 million, whereas the average bidder size for non-cash dominated deals is larger 
(US$ 5,092.108 million). Bidders in cash-dominated deals have significantly higher mean 
and median leverage and collateral relative to bidders in non-cash dominated deals. 
Furthermore, bidders book-to-market mean (median) ratio is significantly higher in cash-
financed acquisitions 0.530 (0.417), than in acquisitions with less than 50% cash (0.442 
(0.339)), which is consistent with the growth opportunities story. Additionally, bidders mean 
(median) run-up is significantly lower in cash deals (0.010 (-0.069)) relative to non-cash 
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 A higher rating level corresponds to a larger number (i.e., 22 for AAA and 1 for D – in our case the lowest 
number is 5 as the lower credit rating level is CCC). 
16
 In the robustness checks section we also proxy for bidders’ credit quality by using a dummy variable for 
investment-grade firms (i.e., firms with a credit rating BBB- or above). 
14 
 
dominated acquisitions (0.209 (-0.027)). The figures from the run-up variable support the  
overvaluation theory. Regarding blockholder ownership, in cash acquisitions bidders have 
relatively more concentrated ownership with a mean (median) of 25.97% (22.63%), while in 
non-cash dominated deals they are more widely diffused (17.59% (11.82%)). This finding is 
in line with the corporate control hypothesis. Cash flows to assets is significantly higher in 
cash acquisitions with a mean (median) of 0.052 (0.074) than in non-cash dominated 
acquisitions (-0.046 (0.013)), in support of the free cash flow hypothesis. Finally, the number 
of analysts does not appear to differ between the two methods of payment.  
Panel B presents the statistics for target characteristics. Target mean (median) leverage 
is significantly lower in cash deals (0.174 (0.108)) than in non-cash dominated deals (0.204 
(0.153)). Concerning target book-to-market ratio we are not able to establish a significant 
mean or median difference between the two methods of payment. Additionally, target mean 
and median blockholder ownership and profitability are significantly higher in cash deals 
than in non-cash dominated financed deals. Regarding target firm number of analysts, it 
seems to be significantly higher in non-cash dominated deals than cash acquisitions. 
Panel C presents the statistics for deal-specific characteristics, which, again, appear to 
differ between the two financing categories. The mean (median) interest rate spread is 
significantly higher in cash-financed acquisitions 2.188 (2.120), than in less than 50% cash 
financed acquisitions (2.090 (2.050)). The average (median) size of the target relative to the 
bidder (relative size) is lower for cash deals 23.0% (8.6%), than the relative size of non-cash 
dominated deals 33.2% (13.0%). Consistent with our previous analysis, the percentage of 
bidders and targets being in the same industry is lower for non-cash dominated deals 
(34.22%), while cash deals have a higher proportion of diversifying deals (38.47%). The 
statistics for the hostile deals support the mode of acquisition hypothesis as the percentage of 
hostile acquisitions is higher in cash deals (2.19%) than in less than 50% cash acquisitions 
15 
 
(0.81%). Moreover, 8.40% of cash-financed acquisitions represent tender offers, while only 
1.28% of non-cash dominated form of financing are tender offers. In cash deals the 
percentage of acquisitions of private targets accounts for 72.66% of the overall sample, while 
in non-cash dominated deals acquisitions of private targets represent the 57.10% of the 
overall sample. Finally, the number of bidders is significantly higher, on average, in cash 
deals (1.035) than in non-cash dominated deals (1.024).  
[Please Insert Table 1 About Here] 
Table 2 presents the descriptive statistics by rated and unrated bidders. The statistics 
from this table will shed further light on the relation between the method of payment and 
credit ratings. Panel A presents bidder characteristics. Rated bidders are, on average, larger 
(US$ 12,920.240 million) than unrated ones (US$ 1,508.230 million). Further, rated bidders 
have significantly higher mean and median leverage, collateral, book-to-market and lower 
mean and median pre-acquisition run-up than unrated bidders. The average (median) 
blockholder ownership is lower for the rated bidders (18.30% (13.88%)) relative to the 
unrated ones (22.90% (18.71%)). Finally, rated bidders also exhibit higher mean and median 
cash holdings and number of analysts than bidders without a credit rating.  
Panel B reports statistics for targets characteristics by rated and unrated bidders. Target 
firms receiving bid offers by rated bidders appear to have higher mean and median leverage, 
book-to-market, number of analysts and profitability ratios than target firms associated with 
unrated bidders.  
With respect to deal characteristics, the relative size of the transactions appears to differ 
as the median value of the rated group is 0.086 and is significantly lower than the unrated 
group (0.111). Further, in the rated group the mean (median) fraction of cash that is used as 
method of payment is greater (0.506 (0.505)) than the unrated group (0.457 (0.424)). 
Concerning hostile acquisitions and tender offers, rated bidders execute more deals of these 
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types compared to unrated ones. Finally, we find that rated bidders are involved in less 
private deals and face a higher degree of competition in the takeover contest than unrated 
ones. 
[Please Insert Table 2 About Here] 
From the analysis so far, we have noticed that rated bidders have, for instance, 
significantly larger size and higher leverage, among others, than unrated bidders. 
Additionally, size and leverage are important determinants of the financing method in M&As. 
Therefore, in order to establish a more concrete statistical relationship and uncover the net 
effects of the credit rating variables, we present, in the next section, multivariate analysis 
controlling for several determinants of the choice of payment method.  
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 Fractional Logit Regressions and Probit Regressions 
In order to investigate the relationship between credit ratings and the choice of payment 
form in acquisitions, we firstly use as dependent variable the fraction of cash as part of the 
total price offered by the bidder. Since by definition this variable is a fractional response and 
lies in the interval [0, 1], we follow Papke and Wooldridge (1996) and use a Generalized 
Linear Model (GLM) Logit regression where the parameters of the model are obtained by the 
Quasi-Maximum Likelihood Estimator (QMLE).  
Furthermore, we try to distinguish the qualitative nature of the choice of the medium of 
payment by using Probit regressions. The parameters of the Probit model are computed with 
the method of Maximum Likelihood Estimator (MLE). In this respect, our dependent variable 
takes the value of 1 for deals financed with more than 50% cash and 0 for deals financed with 
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4.1.1 Credit Rating Existence and Method of Payment 
Initially, we examine the relation between bidder credit rating existence and method of 
payment by controlling for various bidder-, and deal-specific characteristics. All regressions 
also control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed.
18
 
Additionally, we use heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors adjusted also for bidder 
clustering due to the presence of repeated acquirers in our sample.
19
 Table 3 presents the 
results, in which the first main variable of interest is the rating existence. Specification (1) 
presents the estimates for the (GLM) Logit and specification (2) the estimates for the Probit 
model. Noticeably, we observe that the relationship between cash deals and rating existence 
is insignificant at conventional levels. This finding is in line with our prediction that the mere 
existence of credit rating does not prove ex-ante the superior debt capacity of rated firms.  
Additionally, in our regression we are able to confirm the results from the past literature 
as we find that most of our control variables have a significant relationship with the cash 
consideration. More specifically, the independent variable that captures firm’s financial 
condition (i.e., leverage) carries a positive and significant coefficient. Book-to-market is 
consistent with the growth opportunities theory as it is positively related with the use of cash. 
Further, we are able to confirm the market timing hypothesis , since we find that run-up is 
                                                             
17
 A benefit of a Probit regression is that it allows us to focus on the qualitative decision of firms to finance with 
cash or stock. In many mixed deals the acquirer does not always specify the actual percentage of cash financing, 
as target shareholders are offered with a choice of cash or stock financing. Thus, the decision can also be 
specified as choosing among cash, stock or a mixture. In that respect, an Ordered Probit regression is preferred, 
in which the dependent variable is 0 for pure stock deals, 1 for mixed deals, and 2 for all cash deals as in Faccio 
and Masulis (2005); using this type of regression, our results are qualitatively similar. 
18
  We define industries according to the Fama-French 12 industry classification codes, retrieved from the 
website of Kenneth French (http://mba.tuck.dartmouth.edu/pages/faculty/ken.french/index.html). 
19
 Our results should not be affected by any potential multicollinearity, given the large sample size with 
sufficient variation in our explanatory variables. We still perform a multicollinearity (VIF) test for all 
specifications throughout the paper and find that correlation between explanatory variables does not have any 
material effect on our estimates. 
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negatively associated with cash method of payment. That is firms with high pre-acquisition 
valuations are less likely to use cash in the transaction. In addition, we find that the higher the 
concentration of ownership the more likely the use of cash consideration, as blockholder 
ownership holds a positive and statistically significant coefficient at conventional levels. The 
free cash flow hypothesis is also supported by our results; cash flows to assets variable 
carries a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance level. With respect to 
information asymmetry, we corroborate the past literature and find that the bidder number of 
analysts is negatively associated with the use of cash. Relative size is negatively related with 
the use of cash in M&As, while the target private status is positively associated with cash 
financing. Lastly, we document that in hostile and tender offer deals, cash is more likely to be 
the means of payment.  
[Please Insert Table 3 About Here] 
 
4.1.2 Credit Rating Level and Method of Payment  
In the previous section we documented that when we take into account a variety of 
factors known to affect the method of payment decision, there is no significant relationship 
between the existence of credit ratings and the use of cash. In this section, we attempt to shed 
light on our second research question: How is credit quality related with the method of 
payment in M&As? In this respect, we use the rating level as our main variable of interest. 
Table 3 (specifications (3) and (4)) presents the results for this analysis. First, in specification 
(3) we present the results for the fractional Logit regression where the dependent variable is 
the fraction of cash used during acquisitions. Our main variable of interest has a positive and 
significant coefficient at the 1% significance level. Consistent with our prediction, the  higher 
the credit rating level, the higher the likelihood of a cash acquisition. This result has a strong 
economic significance, as one point rise in the rating level increases the likelihood of using 
19 
 
cash mode of payment in acquisitions in our overall sample by 7.04%.
20
 From the remaining 
control variables, size, cash flows to assets, relative size, hostile, tender offers and private 




In specification (4), we examine the relation between rating level and the likelihood of 
cash by using the results of the Probit regression where the dependent variable is the choice 
between deals financed with more than 50% cash and deals financed with more than 50% 
stock. The rating level is positive and significant at the 1% significance level, controlling for 
all other bidder and deal-specific characteristics.
21
 Overall, the results from this section 
support our conjectures for the positive impact of credit rating level on the probability to use 
cash financing in acquisitions.  
 
4.2 Unused Debt Capacity and Method of Payment 
Myers and Majluf (1984) propose a specific financial rationale for M&As based on the 
complementary fit between different levels of debt capacity of bidders and targets. Bruner 
(1988) concentrates particularly in the case in which target firms with increased growth 
opportunities face capital constraints regarding the financing of their investment 
opportunities; the author suggests that it always pays for a bidder with higher debt capacity 
and lower growth opportunities to acquire a capital constrained target, since the higher debt 
capacity of the combined firm will help the firm to put forward all the positive NPV projects 
that the constrained firm might pass up. On the other hand, Smith and Kim (1994) 
empirically document that the positive effect of unused debt capacity materializes from the 
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 This is estimated by calculating average marginal effects and dividing the coefficient of our main independent 
variable of interest to the mean value of the percentage of cash that is used for acquisitions in our total sample.  
21
 We also put as dependent variable the value of 1 for deals with more than 50% stock and 0 for deals financed 
with more than 50% cash and find the opposite result. In particular, the dependent variable experiences a 




opposite direction; that is, a capital constrained bidder acquires an unconstrained target.  
Hence, considerations of unused debt capacity between the merging firms can influence the 
likelihood of using cash as a method of payment; this is mainly due to the fact that the unused 
debt capacity in one of the two merging parties will lead bidders to use cash for the 
consummation of the deal, since any increase in leverage associated with cash payments will 
be absorbed by the unused debt capacity of the combined firm.  
To capture the effect of unused debt capacity and the potential non-linear relationship 
with the usage of cash, we propose the unused debt capacity variable, which measures the 
difference in debt capacity between the two merging participants and is computed by using 
the ratio of the two merging firms’ credit rating levels. Specifically, for the cases where the 
bidder holds a higher credit rating than the target, the unused debt capacity is equal to the 
ratio (Βidder Rating/Target Rating), whereas in the cases where the target holds a higher 
rating than the bidder the independent variable is equal to the ratio (Target Rating/Bidder 
Rating). This approach results in a continuous variable with a minimum value of 1 (where 
credit ratings are exactly the same for merging parties) and larger values indicate greater 
unused debt capacity irrespective of whether it comes from the bidder's side or from the 
target's side.
22
 Furthermore, we follow Bruner (1988) and create an interaction variable 
between unused debt capacity and relative size of the deal. This can be justified by the fact 
that the impact of unused debt capacity of the merging firms on the choice of cash method of 
payment should decrease in large transaction values, since it is more difficult to raise large 
amounts of cash as the size of the deal increases to very high levels. It is worth mentioning 
that in our sample of 353 deals where both bidders and targets possess a credit rating, roughly 
69% of the deals consists of bidders with a higher credit rating level than targets with a mean 
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 We acknowledge an anonymous referee for suggesting this variable. 
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(median) value of 1.21 (1.13). This is translated in bidders holding approximately 3 (2) 
notches higher credit ratings than targets.    
Table 4 presents the results for this analysis , which runs a (GLM) Logit regression in 
model (1) and a Probit regression in model (2). We notice that the number of observations 
reduces significantly due to the requirement that target firms should also hold a credit rating, 
which leaves private deals out of this analysis. In specification (1) the unused debt capacity 
coefficient is positive and statistically significant at the 5% level. This result confirms our 
prediction for the existence of a non-linear relationship between the unused debt capacity of 
the merging parties and the choice of payment method. Furthermore, the estimate from the 
interaction variable suggests that the incremental effect of unused debt capacity on the 
proportion of cash financing is not affected by the relative size of the deal.  In specification 
(2) we run the same analysis for the Probit regression and the coefficient on the unused debt 
capacity is again positive and significant at the 5% level. Overall, the results imply that the 
existence of unused debt capacity constitutes a determinant of the use of cash as a method of 
payment in M&As lending further support to the importance of credit ratings in the choice of 
acquisition financing.  
[Please Insert Table 4 About Here] 
 
5. Further Robustness Tests 
In the previous analysis we provided evidence that firms with high credit quality (i.e., 
firms holding a higher credit rating) are more likely to use cash or a higher fraction of cash 
when they finance an acquisition, while we did not find any strong evidence of a relationship 
between the choice of cash method of payment and credit rating existence. In this section, we 




5.1 Investment-Grade Vs Speculative-Grade Firms 
In order to shed further light on the relationship between credit rating quality and the 
choice of payment method in M&As, we investigate, for robustness reasons, the impact of 
investment grade credit ratings. Investment-grade firms are the ones rated with BBB- or 
above as in An and Chan (2008). These firms are, in general, of higher creditworthiness 
relative to the speculative-grade firms (i.e. firms with a credit rating below BBB-). In this 
respect, Longstaff, Mithal and Neis (2005) and Chen, Lesmond and Wei (2007) demonstrate 
that investment grade firms generate lower bond yield spreads relative to the speculative 
grade ones. Additionally, Molina (2005) and Almeida and Philippon (2007) empirically 
document that default costs are considerably lower for investment-grade firms than for the 
speculative-grade ones. Furthermore, due to the absence of regulation restrictions regarding 
allocations in securities of investment grade firms (see Kisgen (2007) and Kisgen and Strahan 
(2010)) these firms enjoy a larger clientele base and a higher demand for their debt securities. 
If investment grade firms face lower cost of debt capital and have a wider access to investors, 
then it is plausible that they are able to borrow more and use cash more frequently as a 
method of payment in a takeover deal. Thus, we create the variable investment grade dummy 
taking the value of 1 for firms rated BBB- and above, and 0 otherwise. Table 5 reports the 
results.  
In specification (1) the dependent variable is the fraction of cash as part of the total 
price offered by the bidder and in specification (2) the dependent variable is the choice 
between more than 50% cash and more than 50% stock consideration. In both specifications 
we also incorporate the control variables employed in previous analyses. The coefficient of 
the investment grade carries a positive and significant coefficient at the 1% significance level 
in both specifications. In economic terms , being an investment grade bidder increases the 
likelihood of using cash as a payment form by 19.68% over our sample average. Overall, the 
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results of this analysis add further support to our hypothesis that firms with high credit 
quality are more likely to use cash financing in M&As. 
[Please Insert Table 5 About Here] 
 
5.2 Endogeneity Control 
So far, in our analysis we treated the credit rating variables as exogenous to our model; 
that is the decision to obtain a credit rating and the level of credit ratings are randomly 
allocated across our sample firms. However, Liu and Malatesta (2005), An and Chan (2008) 
and Harford and Uysal (2014) argue that firms determine, at least partially, whether to obtain 
a credit rating or have a higher rating level after considering the benefits against the potential 
costs. Therefore, it is likely that the decision to obtain a (high) credit rating is based on firm 
specific characteristics and failure to account for these characteristics would lead to biased 
estimates in our analysis. Since in our case one of the dependent variable has a discrete nature 
(cash-dominated) and the Endogenous Explanatory Variables (EEVs) rating existence and 
rating level are of discrete and continuous nature respectively, we apply several econometric 
methodologies to control for endogeneity bias. In the case of rating existence we use: i) a 
Bivariate Probit model; and ii) a Control Function approach. The Bivariate Probit model uses 
Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) and estimates the selection and structural equations 
simultaneously. MLE estimation is more efficient than classic two-stage procedures when the 
error terms on the selection and structural equations have a bivariate normal distribution (An 
and Chan (2008). Alternatively, another approach that can tackle the issue of endogeneity 
when both dependent and explanatory variables are discrete is the two-step Control Function 
Approach, which has been suggested by Wooldridge (2002). Control Function estimators 
firstly calculate the model of endogenous regressors as a function of instruments, like the 
“first stage” of Two Stage Least Squares (2SLS), and then use the errors from the reduced 
24 
 
model as an additional regressor in the structural model. If the coefficient of the included 




In the case of the rating level which constitutes a continuous variable we employ: i) the 
Instrumental-Variables (IV) Probit method (see Lee (1981) and Acemoglu, Aghion, Lelarge, 
Van Reenen and Zilibotti (2007)), which is similar to the 2SLS method, except that the 
structural regression is a Probit model and not an OLS linear regression; and ii) we use the 
Two Stage Conditional Maximum Likelihood (2SCML) method of Newey (1987).  
In order to apply all four approaches discussed above and get unbiased estimates, 
instruments are essential; that is variables which determine the probability of a bidder holding 
a credit rating or having a high rating, and concurrently are not related with the main 
dependent variables (cash-dominated) in our structural models. It is likely that factors 
influencing a firm’s decision to access public debt markets might also influence a firm’s  
decision to use cash as a payment method in acquisitions. In this respect, a better strategy 
would be to avoid firm-specific attributes that determine the probability of having a debt 
rating and use industry-specific attributes instead.
24
 To accomplish this task we follow the 
literature on firms’ “debt composition” and “determinants of credit rating levels” (Johnson 
(1997), Krishnaswami, Spindt and Subramaniam (1999), Cantillo and Wright (2000), Denis 
and Mihov (2003), Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and 
LaFond (2006)) and use variables that have been proposed to account for these effects.  
Specifically, Faulkender and Petersen (2006) and An and Chan (2008) suggest that a 
firm is more likely to issue a public bond and obtain a credit rating when it operates in a well 
established industry, since it is possible that the bond market investors already know the 
                                                             
23 In that case the coefficient of the included residual captures the degree of correlation “ρ” among the residuals 
in the reduced and structural regressions, which is a valid and simple test of endogeneity (Wooldridge (2002)).  
24 In order to draw valid inferences and avoid any weak instrument biases when applying industry -specific 
instruments, in this section we do not include industry fixed effects in our regressions. 
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competitors and are familiar with the economic condition of the industry. Therefore, this 
reduces the potential costs of information collection that the banks incur when they agree to 
underwrite a bond issue. To control for this effect, we compute the fraction of firms with 
credit ratings in the same 3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end prior to the 
acquisition and use the log of 1 plus this fraction (industry fraction). Johnson (1997) and 
Cantillo and Wright (2000) argue that public credit markets cater to profitable or safe 
industries with low default risk. Obviously, bondholders prefer to invest their money in safe 
securities that yield a periodical interest (i.e., in effect their opportunity cost of capital), and 
expect at the maturity to collect normally their principal in full. Industries with high and 
steady cash flows face low default probability, since an abundance or low volatility of cash 
flows serves as a guarantee that the firms are likely to fulfill timely their debt obligations. To 
control for the effect of profitability we calculate the median industry profitability (defined as 
the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total 
assets) of bidders’ same 3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end preceding the 
acquisition (industry profitability). Accordingly, to measure the impact of credit risk we use 
the standard deviation of the industry’s profitability (industry risk). 
 Finally, a number of studies (Smith (1986), Smith and Watts (1992), Krishnaswami, 
Spindt and Subramaniam (1999) and Ashbaugh-Skaife, Collins and LaFond (2006)) contend 
that regulated firms tap the public capital markets more frequently, thus revealing firm’s cost 
of capital, which is beneficiary for firms in the process of setting their rating. The periodic 
use of capital markets disciplines management and constrains their discretion in investment 
and operating decisions. Furthermore, these papers suggest that, relative to unregulated firms, 
regulated firms engage more rarely in asset substitution and underinvestment as state utility 
commissions and other regulatory authorities supervise managerial decisions. To sum up, it 
follows that firms in regulated industries exhibit low agency costs and, hence, the need for 
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the monitoring role of private debt is limited, a fact that leads to a higher reliance on public 
debt when debt capital is required. To deal with this effect, we use an indicator variable that 
equals with 1 if the firm is a financial institution or utility firm (1-digit SIC level 6 or 2-digits 
SIC level 49), and 0 otherwise (regulated industry).  
[Please Insert Table 6 About Here] 
Table 6 reports the results of this analysis. Specification (1) presents the reduced Probit 
model measuring the probability of having a credit rating. Two of our excluded instruments, 
industry fraction and industry profitability are statistically significant at the 1% significance 
level and have the expected signs. To examine the strength of our instruments we follow 
Stock and Yogo (2002) and use the weak identification test critical values for the “maximal 
IV Wald size distortion”. However, as Nichols (2007) notes, these identification statistics 
only apply to the linear case - not the nonlinear analogs - including those estimated with 
generalized linear models. Therefore, in practice researchers should report the ident ification 
statistics for the closest linear analog (i.e., in our case the closest linear analog for the first 
stage is either a Linear Probability Model (LPM) or a Linear Regression Model and for the 
second stage is a Linear Probability Model (LPM)) and be careful when drawing inferences 
from their values.
25
 In the first lower panel of Table 6, we report the F-test for the joint 
significance of the excluded instruments in the first-stage regression, and the critical values 
for the desired 10% size distortion on a nominal 5% Wald test, computed by the Limited 
Information Maximum Likelihood (LIML) estimator. The F-test is larger than the 
corresponding critical values and, hence, we can reject the null of excluded instruments’ 
weakness. In both specifications (2) and (3) the coefficient on rating existence is insignificant 
at conventional levels. Finally, in the second lower panel of Table 6 we report the Wald test 
of endogeneity for the structural equation (2) which does not reject the null of no endogeneity 
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 This is indeed the case as the F-test from the Probit regression has a value of 50.30 and is significantly higher 
than the reported F-test value from the LPM regression in Table 6. This is due to the fact that the rating choice is 
a binary variable and the Probit regression specifies better this decision than the LPM regression. 
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for the rating existence, while in specification (3) the rating existence residual is statistically 
insignificant at conventional levels. These findings imply that the variable rating existence is 




With regards to the correction for endogeneity in the case of the variable rating level, 
we apply the IV Probit and 2SCML methods, with the rating level choice equation (OLS) 
being the reduced form, and the method of payment equations (Probit) being the structural 
forms. Additionally, we substitute the instrument industry fraction with the variable industry 
level, which is the median credit rating level of the bidders’ same 3-digit SIC industry group 
at the fiscal year-end preceding the acquisition, to control for the credit quality level of the 
industry.  
     [Please Insert Table 7 About Here] 
Table 7 shows the results for this analysis. In the reduced model (1) three out of the 
four instruments (industry level, industry risk  and regulated industry) are highly statistically 
significant and carry the expected coefficients. Furthermore, the results from the 
identification statistics reject the null of excluded instruments’ weakness. In both structural 
equations (2) and (3) the variable of interest rating level, is statistically significant at the 10% 
and 5% levels respectively. Additionally, in the second lower panel of Table 7 the results 
from the endogeneity tests (Hausman and Wald) show that the rating level is exogenous to 
our model. Therefore, given that we are not able to identify any existence of endogeneity bias 
for the rating level in these regressions, we can base our inferences on the results of Table 3, 
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 Additionally in order to control for endogeneity in the case of rating existence we employ two alternative 
approaches: 1) a propensity score matching approach using the same instruments and independent variables as 
in Table 6; and 2) the quasi-natural experiment in Harford and Uysal (2013) where we run regressions on a 
sample of firms that did not have a credit rating two years prior to the acquisition (t-2) but hold one at the year 




in which the regressions are consistent and efficient.
27
 Overall, the findings support our 
hypothesis of a positive association between credit rating level and the likelihood of using 
cash as a method of payment in acquisitions.  
Finally, we follow Larcker and Rusticus (2010) and Fu, Kraft and Zhang (2012) and 
assess how severe must the endogeneity problem be in order to overturn our main results. It is 
well known that the bias produced by the omitted variable is affected by the omitted 
variable’s correlation with the independent variable of interest and its correlation with the 
dependent variable. The stronger the two correlations, the more biased the coefficient 
estimate, where the product of the two correlations indicates the degree of the bias. Frank 
(2000) follows the above logic and derives the minimum correlations necessary to turn a 
statistically significant into an insignificant result by estimating the Impact Threshold for a 
Confounding Variable (ITCV). The larger (smaller) the ITCV, the more (less) robust the 
main results are to omitted variables concerns. Given that in our main results of Table 3 the 
variable rating existence was already insignificant, this approach is only meaningful for the 
case of rating level.  
The ITCV for rating level is presented in Table 8. The threshold value for rating level 
is -0.072 implying that the correlations between rating level and cash-dominated with the 
unobserved confounding variable each only need to be 0.268 (=      ) for the main results 
to be overturned. The ITCV seems strong enough to suggest that our main results are robust 
to omitted variable concerns. Notwithstanding, in order to examine more analytically this 
issue we use our control variables to compute a benchmark for the magnitude of possible 
correlations involving the unobserved confounding variable. To accomplish that, we calculate 
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 It is worth noting that since we employ instruments to measure the choice of credit rating level, by 
construction the coefficients of rating level in the IV Probit and 2SCML regressions exhibit higher standard 
errors (i.e., loss in efficiency) than the regressions which do not account for endogeneity. Therefore, it is likely 
in some cases the rating level to appear less statistically significant at conventional levels. In support to this 
argument, the relatively lower significance sources from the higher standard errors, given that the coefficients of 
the main variable of interest in the structural regressions have similar magnitude to the ones of our main results 
in Table 3. 
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the impact for each of our control variables, that is defined as the product of the partial 
correlation between the x-variable and the control variable and the correlation between the y-
variable and the control variable (partialling out the effect of other control variables). In 
column (2) we present the impact of the inclusion of each independent variable on the 
coefficient of rating level. The variable with the largest impact on the coefficient for rating 
level is size with a value of -0.067. This entails that we would need a confounding variable 
with a stronger impact than size to overturn our results. Specifically, the ITCV is larger than 
the impact of all the control variables (including size), and thus, taking into account that in 
this study we employ a good set of control variables known from the literature to affect the 
payment method in M&As, these results provide confidence in the estimate of the effect of 
rating level on the choice of cash method of payment in acquisitions.  
In column (3) we also calculate the Impactraw for each of the control variables, which is 
based on the raw correlations instead of the partial correlations and is a more conservative 
measure of impact. In column (3) only two control variables (size and private) have higher 
impact than the relevant ITCV, which again suggests that under the assumption that we have 
a good set of control variables, it is unlikely that such an unobserved confounding variable 
exists; this implies that our main results for rating level are robust to omitted variables 
concerns. Overall, the results in Tables 7 and 8 indicate that rating level is positively related 
with the usage of cash in acquisitions, both before and after we consider potential 
endogeneity issues.  
     [Please Insert Table 8 About Here] 
 
5.3    Target Firm Characteristics and Method of Payment  
Finally, in this section, we focus on a subsample of public acquisitions and include in 
our regressions target firm characteristics known from the literature to affect the method of 
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payment in M&As. In particular, it has been suggested that a target firm’s leverage (Hansen 
(1987)), growth opportunities (Martin (1996)), share ownership (Ghosh and Ruland (1998)), 
and information asymmetry (Chemmanur, Paeglis and Simonyan (2009)) exert an impact on 
the likelihood of using cash as a payment form. In particular, target’s growth opportunities, 
share ownership and information asymmetry are expected to have a negative association with 
the choice of cash in acquisitions, while the predicted relationship of a target firm’s leverage 
with the likelihood of using cash is ambiguous. To control for these effects we add on the top 
of the control variables used in the previous analysis supplementary target firm’s variables 
(Tleverage, Tbook-to-market, Tblockholder ownership, Tnumber of analysts and 
Tprofitability) and report the results in Table 9. We use GLM Logit regressions in 
specifications (1) and (3) and probit regressions in specifications (2) and (4). Specifications 
(1) and (2) present the results in which the main variable of interest is the rating existence 
and specifications (3) and (4) show the findings for the rating level variable as main variable 
of interest. With regards to the rating existence, we are not able to establish any significant 
relationship at conventional levels; however, the rating level variable continues to be strongly 
positively associated with cash acquisitions as it carries positive and significant coefficients 
at the 1% level in both specifications. From the target control variables, Tleverage, Tnumber 
of analysts and Tprofitability are negative and statistically significant in, at least, two out of 
the four specifications. In a nutshell, the results of this analysis add more evidence regarding 
the robustness of our basic findings and imply that firms’ credit quality is an important 
determinant of the financing decision in M&As.
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     [Please Insert Table 9 About Here] 
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 We also employ the econometric methods discussed above for the existence of endogeneity on this set of 




In this paper we present direct empirical analysis of the relation between credit ratings 
and the choice of method of payment in mergers and acquisitions. In particular, we examine 
whether rating existence and rating level affect the likelihood of cash being used as a form of 
financing in a takeover bid. In our empirical analysis, we use different econometric 
approaches to examine this relationship and we are able to establish a positive relation 
between a bidders’ credit rating level and cash payment method. The results are attributed to 
the lower financial constraints of firms with a high credit rating, as implied by their higher 
credit quality. Our investment grade results also confirm the findings on rating level analysis 
corroborating the view that cash method of payment is an increasing function of credit 
quality. Further, unused debt capacity between the counterparties appears to determine the 
choice of cash method of payment lending further support to the relationship of credit ratings 
with the financing choice. Moreover, our results have a strong economic significance and are 
robust even after controlling for endogeneity issues regarding the main variables of interest. 
Additionally, in response to the questions raised in the introduction, the findings of this 
paper imply that higher capability to access public debt markets affects the choice of payment 
method in M&As. In particular, high credit quality, which is associated with lower cost and 
higher demand for debt securities, allows highly rated bidding firms to be less reluctant to use 
cash in an acquisition investment as it is less painful for them to find cash for new 
investments in the future.  
This study adds to the prior literature by providing further evidence on how credit 
ratings affect firm capital structure decisions in general, and financing decisions in the M&As 
process more specifically. In particular, we establish a direct relationship of credit ratings as a 
determinant of the choice of payment method. The positive likelihood of using cash as a 
method of payment in acquisitions in which firms have high credit quality can be considered 
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as a high value asset for bidders’ shareholders, given the well-documented fact that cash 
consideration is related with various beneficial outcomes for shareholders of bidding firms, 
such as favorable valuation effects and determent of competition in the market for corporate 
control. Overall, this paper highlights the role of CRAs in firm’s capital structure decisions 
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Appendix A. Variable Definitions 
Variable Definition 
                                   Panel A: Measures of Payment Form  
Fraction of Cash Fraction of cash as part of the total price offered by the bidder to the target 
shareholders from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Cash-dominated Dummy variable: 1 for deals financed with more than 50% cash, 0 for 
deals financed with more than 50% stock from Thomson Financial SDC.  
                                                                        Panel B: Credit Rating Variable 
Rating Existence  Dummy variable: 1 for rated bidders, 0 for unrated bidders. 
Rating Level  Continuous variable for rated bidders: 1 to 22, AAA level takes 22 and D 
takes 1.  
Investment Grade Dummy variable: 1 for investment grade bidders (above BBB- threshold), 
0 for speculative grade bidders (below BBB- threshold). 
Unused Debt Capacity The ratio of bidder to target credit rating in cases where the former is 
higher than the latter, and the ratio of target to bidder credit rating in cases 
where the former is higher than the latter. 
Panel C: Firm Characteristics 
Size Firm market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the acquisition announcement 
from CRSP in US$ million.  
 
 
Leverage Firm total financial debt (long-term debt plus debt in current liabilities) 
divided by the book value of total assets in the fiscal year prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
Collateral The ratio of firm’s property, plant and equipment to total assets at the fiscal 
year immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Book-to-Market (B/M) Book value of equity at the fiscal year-end prior to the acquisition 
announcement divided by the market value of equity 4 weeks prior to the 
acquisition announcement. Book value of equity is from COMPUSTAT, 
market value of equity is from CRSP.  
 
Run-Up Market-adjusted buy-and-hold returns of the firm over the period starting (-
205, -6) days prior to the acquisition announcement from CRSP.  
Blockholder Ownership Aggregate holdings of blockholders who own at least 5% of the company’s 
stock from Thomson One ownership database. 
Cash Flows to Assets Income before extraordinary items plus depreciation minus dividends  on 
common and preferred stock divided by the total assets  at the fiscal year-end 
immediately prior to the announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Number of Analysts The number of equity analysts following the firm replaced by 0 for firms not 







Profitability The ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization 
(EBITDA) to total assets  at the fiscal year immediately prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
Panel D: Deal Characteristics 
Interest Rate Spread The spread on the interest rate charged for all industrial and commercial loans 
over intended federal funds rate. The spread is from the Survey of Terms of 
Business Lending published by the Federal Reserve Bank of New York in its 
E2 release. 
 
Relative Size The ratio of the deal’s value to bidder’s market value of equity 4 weeks prior 
to the acquisition announcement from CRSP in US$ million. 
 
Diversifying Deals Dummy variable: 1 for inter-industry transactions, 0 for intra-industry 
transactions. Industries are defined at the 2-digit SIC level from Thomson 
Financial SDC. 
 
Hostile Deals Dummy variable: 1 for deals defined as "hostile" or "unsolicited" by 
Thomson Financial SDC, 0 otherwise.  
 
Tender Offers Dummy variable: 1 for tender offers from Thomson Financial SDC, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Private Dummy variable: 1 for private targets  from Thomson Financial SDC, 0 
otherwise. 
 
Number of Bidders Number of bidders during the takeover deal from Thomson Financial SDC. 
Competition Dummy variable: 1 if more than one bidders enter the contest, 0 otherwise. 
 
 Panel E: Instrumental Variables 
Industry Fraction Log of 1 plus the fraction of firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry group that 
have credit ratings at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition 
announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
 
 Industry Profitability The median ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, depreciation and 
amortization (EBITDA) to total assets  of firms in the same 3-digit SIC 
industry group at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition 
announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Industry Risk The standard deviation of the ratio of earnings before interest, taxes, 
depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) to total assets of firms in the same 
3-digit SIC industry group at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the 
acquisition announcement from COMPUSTAT. 
 
Industry Level The median credit rating level of firms in the same 3-digit SIC industry group 
at the fiscal year-end immediately prior to the acquisition announcement from 
COMPUSTAT. 
  
Regulated Industry Dummy variable: 1 if firm is a financial institution (1-digit SIC level 6) or a 





Sample Descriptive Statistics  by Payment Method 
The table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2009 drawn from the Thomson 
Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. The sample is further classified by the method of payment used in the transaction. The financing category “Cash>50%” includes pay ments 
where the percentage of cash used is more than 50%. The financing category “Cash<50%” includes payments consisting of less th an 50% cash. Panels A, B and C describe the mean and median 
values for bidder-, target- and deal-specific characteristics, respectively. Credit ratings represent the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit ratings from COMPUSTAT. 
Stock price data is from CRSP, accounting data is from COMPUSTAT. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each 
characteristic between the two methods of payment are also presented in parentheses.   
  
 Method of Payment   
 
Total Sample (N=6,819)  (1) Cash>50%  (N=3,156) (2) Cash<50%  (N=3,583)  Difference (1) – (2) 
Variable Mean Median  Mean Median Mean Median  Mean (p-value) Median (p-value) 
Panel A: Bidder Characteristics  
  
 
    
  
 % Rating Existence 25.620 -  27.788 - 24.114 -  (0.000) - 
Size ( in US$ million) 4,431.941 491.321  3,672.396 499.581 5,092.108 491.973  (0.002) (0.875) 
Leverage 0.182 0.133  0.189 0.149 0.175 0.124  (0.004) (0.001) 
Collateral  0.351 0.241  0.364 0.256 0.339 0.226  (0.008) (0.001) 
Book-to-Market 0.484 0.377  0.530 0.417 0.442 0.339  (0.000) (0.000) 
Run-Up 0.114 -0.050  0.010 -0.069 0.209 -0.027  (0.000) (0.001) 
% Blockholder Ownership 21.652 17.190  25.966 22.630 17.588 11.820  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flows to Assets 0.001 0.049  0.052 0.074 -0.046 0.013  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Analysts  0.601 0.000  0.581 0.000 0.620 0.000  (0.392) (0.435) 
Panel B: Target Characteristics  
  
 
    
  
 Leverage 0.192 0.135  0.174 0.108 0.204 0.153  (0.003) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market 0.732 0.525  0.737 0.553 0.730 0.513  (0.902) (0.042) 
% Blockholder Ownership 21.000 16.110  26.770 24.040 17.95 11.990  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Analysts 0.534 0.000  0.401 0.000 0.612 0.000  (0.004) (0.117) 
Profitability 0.030 0.057  0.057 0.089 0.014 0.034  (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics  
  
 
    
  
 Interest Rate Spread 2.137 2.09  2.188 2.120 2.090 2.050  (0.000) (0.000) 
Relative Size 0.283 0.105  0.230 0.086 0.332 0.130  (0.000) (0.000) 
% Diversifying Deals 36.090 -  38.466 - 34.217 -  (0.000) - 
% Hostile Deals 1.466 -  2.19 - 0.809 -  (0.000) - 
% Tender Offers 4.561 -  8.400 - 1.284 -  (0.000) - 
% Private 64.482 -  72.655 - 57.103 -  (0.000) - 




Sample Descriptive Statistics  by Credit Ratings 
The table presents descriptive statistics for a sample of US public and private acquisitions announced over the period between January 1, 1998 and December 31, 2009 drawn from the Thomson 
Financial SDC Mergers and Acquisitions Database. Panels A, B and C describe the mean, median and number of observations for bidder-, target- and deal-specific characteristics, respectively, 
for rated and unrated bidders. Credit ratings represent the Standard & Poor’s (S&P) long-term domestic issuer credit ratings from COMPUSTAT. Stock price data is from CRSP, accounting 
data is from COMPUSTAT. All variables are defined in Appendix A. Statistical tests for differences in means and equality of medians for each characteristic for rated versus unrated bidders are 
also presented in parentheses.   
 
 With Credit Rating (1)  Without Credit Rating (2)  Difference (1)-(2) 
Panel A: Bidder Characteristics   
Mean Median N 
 
Mean  Median N 
 
Mean (p-value)  Median (p-value)  
Size ( in US$ million)  12,920.240 3,092.009 1,747  1,508.230 296.317 5,072  (0.000) (0.000) 
Leverage  0.306 0.273 1,718  0.137 0.072 4,782  (0.000) (0.000) 
Collateral   0.477 0.346 1,436  0.305 0.210 3,930  (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market  0.427 0.360 1,725  0.504 0.386 4,798  (0.000) (0.001) 
Run-Up  0.018 -0.038 1,707  0.150 -0.054 4.566  (0.000) (0.840) 
% Blockholder Ownership  18.298 13.880 1,563  22.898 18.705 4,206  (0.000) (0.000) 
Cash Flows to Assets  0.062 0.061 1,681  -0.021 0.041 4,728  (0.000) (0.000) 
Number of Analysts  1.259 0.000 1,747  0.374 0.000 5,072  (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel B: Target Characteristics             
Leverage  0.252 0.219 830  0.137 0.084 893  (0.000) (0.000) 
Book-to-Market  0.561 0.471 916  0.889 0.617 1,003  (0.000) (0.000) 
% Blockholder Ownership  21.634 17.400 1,023  20.536 14.920 1,399  (0.206) (0.128) 
Number of Analysts  0.921 0.000 1,023  0.251 0.000 1,399  (0.000) (0.000) 
Profitability  0.084 0.100 904  -0.019 0.024 992  (0.000) (0.000) 
Panel C: Deal Characteristics             
Interest Rate Spread  2.137 2.090 1,747  2.138 2.090 5,072  (0.906) (0.735) 
Relative Size  0.275 0.086 1,747  0.286 0.111 5,072  (0.665) (0.000) 
Fraction of Cash  0.506 0.505 1,747  0.457 0.424 5,072  (0.000) (0.000) 
% Diversifying Deals  36.463 - 1,747  35.962 - 5,072  (0.707) - 
% Hostile Deals  3.034 - 1,747  0.927 - 5,072  (0.000) - 
% Tender Offers  9.788 - 1,747  2.760 - 5,072  (0.000) - 
% Private  41.442 - 1,747  72.417 - 5,072  (0.000) - 




 (GLM) Logit and Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating 
Level 
The table presents the results of the (GLM) Logit regression analysis of the fraction of cash financing in specifications (1) and 
(3), and Probit regression analysis of the choice between more than 50% cash and more than 50% stock in specifications (2) and 
(4) on credit rating existence, credit rating level and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample of US 
acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All regressions control for year and 
industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 
5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder 
clustering. N denotes the number of observations. 
  All Sample  Sample With Rating Data 
  GLM Logit (1) Probit (2)  GLM Logit (3) Probit (4) 
Constant  -1.7355*** -0.9239**  -1.4340 -0.0859 
  (-3.44) (-2.02)  (-1.16) (-0.09) 
Rating Existence  0.1655 0.1208    
  (1.64) (1.43)    
Rating Level     0.2043*** 0.1432*** 
     (6.25) (5.42) 
Ln (Size)  0.0202 -0.0167  -0.4382*** -0.3427*** 
  (0.75) (-0.77)  (-6.63) (-6.26) 
Leverage  0.5274** 0.3541**  0.5422 0.3566 
  (2.42) (2.03)  (1.30) (1.03) 
Collateral  0.1197 0.0399  0.0083 0.1664 
  (1.02) (0.40)  (0.04) (0.91) 
Interest Rate Spread  0.1176 0.0845  0.1957 -0.1740 
  (0.52) (0.41)  (0.33) (-0.36) 
Book-to-Market  0.3656*** 0.2651***  -0.1869 -0.0884 
  (3.59) (3.19)  (-1.00) (-0.56) 
Run-Up  -0.2319*** -0.1625***  -0.1888 -0.1021 
  (-4.98) (-4.52)  (-1.44) (-1.02) 
Blockholder Ownership  0.0034*  0.0027*   -0.0014 -0.0033 
  (1.96) (1.88)  (-0.37) (-1.08) 
Cash Flows to Assets  1.9074*** 1.3669***  2.4835** 1.1324*  
  (7.77) (7.70)  (2.55) (1.71) 
Number of Analysts  -0.0488*** -0.0315**  -0.0312 -0.0178 
  (-2.87) (-2.55)  (-1.49) (-1.04) 
Relative Size  -0.2846** -0.1186  -0.4627** -0.2329** 
  (-2.27) (-1.57)  (-2.54) (-2.00) 
Diversifying Deals  -0.0176 -0.0074  0.1749 0.0705 
  (-0.28) (-0.14)  (1.33) (0.60) 
Hostile Deals  0.9854*** 0.6059**  0.8823** 0.4838 
  (3.40) (2.51)  (1.98) (1.34) 
Tender Offers  2.2488*** 1.7993***  2.3418*** 1.8326*** 
  (13.51) (11.38)  (10.08) (7.92) 
Private  1.0379*** 0.9066***  1.1374*** 0.9943*** 
  (11.63) (13.24)  (7.11) (7.70) 
Competition  0.1359 0.2057  0.0608 0.1625 
  (0.66) (1.24)  (0.20) (0.59) 
       
N  4,256 3,823  1,236 1,120 
Pseudo R
2 




 (GLM) Logit and Probit Regressions of the Payment Form on the Unused Debt Capacity 
The table presents the results of the (GLM) Logit regression analysis of the fraction of cash financing 
(specification (1)), and Probit regression analysis of the choice between more than 50% cash and more than 50% 
stock (specification (2)) on the unused debt capacity and other bidder- and deal-specific characteristics for a 
sample of US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All 
regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients  are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** 
and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in 








 GLM (Logit)  Probit 
 (1)  (2) 
Constant -0.0654  1.7152 
 (-0.02)  (0.62) 
Unused Debt Capacity 0.8738**  1.1455** 
 (1.99)  (2.21) 
Unused Debt Capacity x Relative Size -0.1828  0.1679 
 (-0.23)  (0.22) 
Ln (Size) -0.1430  -0.1832* 
 (-1.55)  (-1.82) 
Leverage -0.3615  -0.7772 
 (-0.50)  (-0.93) 
Collateral 0.5783  1.1740*** 
 (1.38)  (2.81) 
Interest Rate Spread -1.2951  -1.5511 
 (-0.96)  (-1.30) 
Book-to-Market -0.2220  -0.0850 
 (-0.60)  (-0.26) 
Run-Up -0.3954  -0.4486 
 (-1.44)  (-1.48) 
Blockholder Ownership 0.0007  -0.0008 
 (0.11)  (-0.11) 
Cash Flows to Assets 2.4075  -2.2714 
 (1.41)  (-1.27) 
Number of Analysts -0.1055***  -0.0665 
 (-2.59)  (-1.47) 
Relative Size 0.0335  -0.3462 
 (0.04)  (-0.38) 
Diversifying Deals 0.3052  0.2447 
 (1.20)  (0.79) 
Hostile Deals 0.5876  0.4145 
 (1.46)  (1.06) 
Tender Offers 2.1249***  1.8898*** 
 (5.97)  (5.10) 
Competition 0.1094  0.0772 
 (0.28)  (0.19) 
    
N 257  218 
Pseudo R
2 




  Regressions of the Payment Form on the Investment Grade 
The table presents the results of the (GLM) Logit (specification (1)), and Probit (specification (2)) regression 
analyses of the choice of the method of payment on investment grade and other bidder- and deal-specific 
characteristics for a sample of US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See Appendix A for definitions of the 
variables. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The 
symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics 
reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N denotes the number of 
observations.
 GLM (Logit)  Probit 
 (1)  (2) 
Constant  -0.3386  0.8201 
 (-0.28)  (0.81) 
Investment Grade 0.5600***  0.4906*** 
 (3.05)  (3.22) 
Ln (Size) -0.2424***  -0.2163*** 
 (-4.22)  (-4.66) 
Leverage 0.2576  0.1832 
 (0.63)  (0.54) 
Collateral 0.1458  0.2590 
 (0.68)  (1.40) 
Interest Rate Spread 0.1894  -0.2401 
 (0.33)  (-0.50) 
Book-to-Market -0.0887  -0.0273 
 (-0.49)  (-0.18) 
Run-Up -0.2661**  -0.1540 
 (-2.09)  (-1.60) 
Blockholder Ownership -0.0027  -0.0045 
 (-0.68)  (-1.41) 
Cash Flows to Assets 2.9392***  1.4702** 
 (2.97)  (2.20) 
Number of Analysts -0.0382*  -0.0249 
 (-1.86)  (-1.51) 
Relative Size -0.5094***  -0.2595** 
 (-2.63)  (-2.18) 
Diversifying Deals 0.1574  0.0483 
 (1.20)  (0.42) 
Hostile Deals 0.8656*   0.4346 
 (1.88)  (1.18) 
Tender Offers 2.2868***  1.7956*** 
 (9.70)  (7.73) 
Private 1.0737***  0.9564*** 
 (6.59)  (7.39) 
Competition 0.1126  0.2368 
 (0.37)  (0.87) 
    
N 1,236  1,120 
Pseudo R
2




Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Existence 
The table presents the results of the control function regression approach to test for potential endogeneity of 
credit rating existence for a sample of US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. Specification (1) is the 
reduced regression. Specification (2) is the structural regression of the bivariate probit method. Specification (3) 
is the structural regression of the control function method. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All 
regressions control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote 
statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N denotes the number of observations. The first lower part 
of the table shows the F-test from the linear first-stage regression testing the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments and the Stock and Yogo (2002) (LIML) critical values of the 10% expected size distortion on a 5% 
nominal Wald test. The second lower part of the table shows the Wald test of endogeneity.  
 Reduced Structural Structural 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant -6.1695*** -1.1565*** -1.0220** 
 (-12.60) (-2.58) (-2.38) 
Rating Existence  0.0338 0.2794 
  (0.11) (0.99) 
Residual Rating   -0.0442 
   (-0.35) 
Industry Fraction 1.4803***   
 (4.54)   
Industry Profitability 1.4871***   
 (3.20)   
Industry Risk -0.0008   
 (-0.52)   
Regulated Industry 0.0624   
 (0.39)   
Ln (Size) 0.6501*** -0.0101 -0.0386 
 (17.68) (-0.24) (-1.08) 
Leverage 3.8881*** 0.6251** 0.4322* 
 (14.27) (2.11) (1.74) 
Collateral  0.0738 0.1536* 0.1346 
 (0.68) (1.78) (1.58) 
Interest Rate Spread -0.1607 -0.0168 -0.0057 
 (-0.72) (-0.08) (-0.03) 
Book-to-Market 0.5765*** 0.3103*** 0.2856*** 
 (4.53) (3.31) (3.11) 
Run-Up -0.2994*** -0.1640*** -0.1536*** 
 (-6.72) (-4.07) (-3.89) 
Blockholder Ownership -0.0009 0.0027* 0.0028* 
 (-0.44) (1.82) (1.95) 
Cash Flows to Assets 1.0399** 1.4966*** 1.4952*** 
 (2.41) (8.16) (8.10) 
Number of Analysts -0.0034 -0.0365*** -0.0370*** 
 (-0.23) (-2.99) (-2.99) 
Relative Size -0.0637 -0.0837 -0.0893 
 (-1.10) (-1.25) (-1.35) 
Diversifying Deals 0.2022*** 0.1033* 0.0954* 
 (2.97) (1.90) (1.75) 
Hostile Deals -0.3840* 0.5669** 0.5788** 
 (-1.74) (2.20) (2.24) 
Tender Offers 0.3486*** 1.8202*** 1.8077*** 
 (2.94) (11.61) (11.49) 
Private -0.2456*** 0.8777*** 0.8938*** 
 (-3.13) (11.82) (12.55) 
Competition 0.0559 0.2455 0.2472 
 (0.32) (1.47) (1.48) 
    
    
N 4,079 3,667 3,667 
Pseudo  R2 0.526 0.389 0.272 
F-test 10.58   
LIML size of nominal  5% Wald                   5.44   
Wald Test                      0.24  




Endogeneity Control for Credit Rating Level  
The table presents the results of the control function regression approach to test for potential endogeneity of 
credit rating level for a sample of US acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. Specification (1) is the reduced 
regression. Specification (2) is the structural regression for the IV Probit method. Specification (3) is the 
structural regression for the 2SCML method. See Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All regressions 
control for year fixed effects whose coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical 
significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, respectively. The t- and z-statistics reported in parentheses are 
adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N denotes the number of observations . The first lower part 
of the table shows the F-test from the linear first-stage regression testing the joint significance of the excluded 
instruments and the Stock and Yogo (2002) (LIML) critical values of the 10% expected size distortion on a 5% 
nominal Wald test. The second lower part of the table shows the Hausman (1978) and Wald test of endogeneity. 
 
 
 Reduced Structural Structural 
 (1) (2) (3) 
Constant 0.9858 0.1868 -0.0033 
 (0.81) (0.18) (-0.00) 
Rating Level  0.1577* 0.1596** 
  (1.85) (1.98) 
Industry Level 0.1456***   
 (4.06)   
Industry Profitability 0.5402   
 (0.57)   
Industry Risk -0.0084**   
 (-2.12)   
Regulated Industry 1.2047***   
 (3.70)   
Ln (Size) 1.3050*** -0.3692*** -0.3785*** 
 (18.57) (-3.06) (-3.29) 
Leverage -2.5610*** 0.1961 0.1859 
 (-4.94) (0.51) (0.50) 
Collateral  0.8516*** 0.0241 0.0315 
 (3.68) (0.17) (0.21) 
Interest Rate Spread 0.1252 -0.2380 -0.1394 
 (0.26) (-0.48) (-0.33) 
Book-to-Market 0.7025*** -0.1388 -0.1205 
 (2.68) (-0.84) (-0.75) 
Run-Up -0.7977*** -0.0995 -0.1074 
 (-5.76) (-0.83) (-0.91) 
Blockholder Ownership -0.0068 -0.0029 -0.0027 
 (-1.63) (-0.88) (-0.84) 
Cash Flows to Assets 4.7281*** 1.4327** 1.3621* 
 (3.54) (2.00) (1.95) 
Number of Analysts -0.0577** -0.0272* -0.0282 
 (-2.00) (-1.65) (-1.55) 
Relative Size -0.2293 -0.2300* -0.2302** 
 (-1.44) (-1.81) (-2.07) 
Diversifying Deals 0.3692** 0.0935 0.1039 
 (2.46) (0.81) (0.97) 
Hostile Deals -0.3618 0.5754 0.5858** 
 (-1.05) (1.37) (2.02) 
Tender Offers 0.5538** 1.8163*** 1.8936*** 
 (2.42) (7.67) (9.55) 
Private -0.2699 0.9326*** 0.9881*** 
 (-1.54) (7.44) (7.83) 
Competition 0.1699 0.2815 0.2428 
 (0.59) (0.99) (1.03) 
    
    
N 1,161 1,053 1,053 
Pseudo (Adjusted)  R2 (0.628) 0.351 0.385 
F-test 13.44   
LIML size of nominal  5% Wald 5.44   
Hausman (Wald) Test  0.00 (0.00) 




Analysis of the Impact of Unobserved Confounding Variables 
The table shows an assessment of the impact of unobserved confounding variables based on Frank (2000). For 
the main control variable (rating level) an impact statistic is calculated (ITCV) indicating the minimum impact 
of a confounding variable that would be needed to render the coefficient statistically insignificant. The ITCV is 
defined as the product of the correlation between the x-variable (rating level) and the confounding variable and 
the correlation between the y-variable (cash-dominated) and the confounding variable. To assess the likelihood 
that such a variable exists, column (2) shows the impact of each independent variable on the coefficient of the 
rating level. The impact is defined as the product of the partial correlation between the x-variable (rating level) 
and the control variable and the correlation between the y-variable (cash-dominated) and the control variable 
(partialling out the effect of the other control variables). Column (3) shows a more conservative measure of 
impact, which is the product of the simple correlation between the x-variable and the control variable and the 







 ITCV Impact Impact Raw  
 (1) (2) (3) 
    
Rating Level -0.072   
    
Ln (Size)  -0.067 -0.088 
    
Leverage  0.002 0.017 
    
Collateral  0.000 -0.001 
    
Interest Rate Spread  -0.020 0.002 
    
Book-to-Market  -0.004 -0.005 
    
Run-Up  0.011 0.021 
    
Blockholder Ownership  -0.011 -0.037 
    
Cash Flows to Assets  0.014 0.038 
    
Number of Analysts  0.003 -0.010 
    
Relative Size  0.002 0.016 
    
Diversifying Deals  0.002 0.006 
    
Hostile Deals  -0.001 0.001 
    
Tender Offers  0.018 0.042 
    
Private  -0.026 -0.091 
    
Competition  0.000 0.000 
    
    




 Regressions of the Payment Form on Credit Rating Existence and Credit Rating Level with Target Firm 
Control Variables 
 The table presents the results of the (GLM) Logit in specifications (1) and (3) and Probit regression analysis in 
specifications (2) and (4) of the choice of method of payment on credit rating existence, credit rating level and other 
bidder-, target- and deal-specific characteristics for a sample of US public acquisitions over the period 1998-2009. See 
Appendix A for definitions of the variables. All regressions control for year and industry fixed effects whose 
coefficients are suppressed. The symbols ***, ** and * denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% levels, 
respectively. The z-statistics reported in parentheses are adjusted for heteroskedasticity and bidder clustering. N denotes 
the number of observations.  
 
 
  All Sample  Sample with Rating Data 
   GLM Logit (1) Probit (2)  GLM Logit (3) Probit (4) 
Constant  -2.2249* -0.9039  -1.2013 -0.0511 
  (-1.73) (-0.91)  (-0.54) (-0.03) 
Rating Existence  0.2091 0.0374    
  (1.19) (0.26)    
Rating Level     0.1547*** 0.0976*** 
     (3.62) (2.94) 
Ln (Size)  0.0735 0.0650*  -0.2289** -0.1307 
  (1.35) (1.69)  (-2.27) (-1.62) 
Leverage  -0.6684 -0.5772*  -0.8263 -0.7679 
  (-1.43) (-1.70)  (-1.22) (-1.46) 
Collateral  -0.0902 0.0119  -0.1640 0.1990 
  (-0.38) (0.06)  (-0.50) (0.73) 
Interest Rate Spread  0.0034 -0.3520  -0.2646 -0.7359 
  (0.01) (-0.73)  (-0.25) (-0.97) 
Book-to-Market  0.2227 0.1695  -0.1610 -0.0642 
  (1.17) (1.40)  (-0.60) (-0.28) 
Run-Up  -0.3628* -0.1597  -0.2270 -0.1484 
  (-1.79) (-1.47)  (-0.94) (-0.83) 
Blockholder Ownership  -0.0010 -0.0011  -0.0049 -0.0041 
  (-0.24) (-0.35)  (-0.86) (-0.89) 
Cash Flows to Assets  2.1351*** 1.3430***  2.4240** 1.1559 
  (4.20) (3.66)  (2.01) (1.38) 
Number of Analysts  -0.0430* -0.0322*  -0.0376 -0.0297 
  (-1.88) (-1.82)  (-1.20) (-1.17) 
TLeverage  -0.8106** -0.0374  -0.8097** -0.1345 
  (-2.52) (-0.14)  (-2.11) (-0.40) 
TBook-to-Market  0.0300 0.0382  0.0472 -0.0603 
  (0.68) (1.18)  (0.31) (-0.38) 
TBlockholder O wnership  0.0037 0.0028  0.0056 0.0045 
  (1.01) (1.04)  (1.02) (1.02) 
TNumber of Analysts  -0.1110*** -0.0915***  -0.1129** -0.1290*** 
  (-2.77) (-2.79)  (-2.48) (-3.08) 
TProfitability  -0.0257 -0.0168  -0.9809** -0.9361** 
  (-0.09) (-0.08)  (-2.06) (-2.28) 
Relative Size  -0.0748 -0.0186  -0.2470 -0.0813 
  (-0.31) (-0.19)  (-1.22) (-0.52) 
Diversifying Deals  -0.0088 -0.0815  -0.2179 -0.2289 
  (-0.06) (-0.75)  (-1.16) (-1.45) 
Hostile  Deals  0.9697*** 0.5698**  0.9000* 0.4980 
  (2.87) (2.19)  (1.83) (1.37) 
Tender Offers  2.3645*** 1.7426***  2.1819*** 1.6112*** 
  (11.43) (10.19)  (7.40) (6.56) 
Competition  0.1272 0.2514  0.2194 0.3235 
  (0.52) (1.37)  (0.66) (1.20) 
       
       
N  1,044 981  558 511 
Pseudo R
2
  0.290 0.336  0.317 0.365 
